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INTRODUCTION 
 
Much apprehension exists as to whether our water 
supplies will be adequate to meet ever-increasing 
demands from household, municipal, industrial, 
agricultural, and recreational users.  Few believe that 
opportunities for new water development are either 
economically or politically feasible.  More attention 
must be given, therefore, to greater efficiency in water 
allocation in order to “stretch” existing supplies, and 
this may require institutional and policy modifications.  
An important issue is whether private or public 
companies can distribute water more efficiently to 
consumers, and this paper will address this question. 
 
Lying behind all discussions of water policy are 
philosophical beliefs and traditions.  To most people 
water is a “social” resource that is owned by the people, 
and this view is explicitly stated in the constitutions of 
most Western states.  Water users obtain entitlement to 
use it through usufructuary rights, created and governed 
by state agencies.  Still, at the retail level both public 
agencies and private companies are permitted to 
distribute water to final consumers, much like any other 
commodity.  A water publication in 1980 indicated that 
at that time approximately 50,000 domestic systems 
sold water to more than 200,000,000 people in the 
United States (Water Utility Management, 1980, p. 1).  
Forty-four percent of these companies were publicly 
owned and managed and they served about 80 percent 
of the population. 
 
Are the public or the private water companies more 
efficient in delivering water to consumers?  More 
empirical studies are needed to more definitively answer 
this question.  And do these private and public 
companies compete on a level playing field as far as the 
regulatory environment is concerned?  Perhaps the 
principal point of this paper is that various 
discriminatory practices and policies have been erected 
to promote public water companies.  At the same time, 
however, in the United States and in many other 
countries, much attention has recently been given to 
privatization of state-owned and administered agencies 
because of the alleged greater efficiency of private 
firms.  It is, therefore, timely to ask whether private 
water companies may be an efficient alternative to 
public firms.  But first I must be explicit about what I 
mean by “economic efficiency.” 
 
WHAT IS ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY? 
 
Economic efficiency is the term used to describe the 
allocation of society's resources in a way which 
maximizes net economic product.  At the firm level, this 
outcome is identical with the maximization of net 
income (revenues from output sales minus the sum of 
all costs incurred).  Efficiency is also sometimes defined 
as cost minimization when the best technology is 
utilized.  Usually high per capita net incomes are very 
closely correlated with high standards of living, so all of 
us have a large stake in an efficient allocation of 
resources. 
 
Applied to water, economic efficiency has both spatial 
and temporal dimensions.  In terms of spatial allocation, 
efficiency requires that water be allocated among 
current users such that the net value of the water at the 
margin is equal for every user.  For example, if water is 
valued at $100 per acre-foot at the margin in use A and 
at $110 in use B, and the cost of moving it from A to B 
is $10 per acre-foot, then an efficient allocation has 
been achieved.  Moving the last unit of water to B 
created a net benefit of $100, exactly the same net 
benefit as the marginal value in use A.  Spatial 
economic efficiency in water allocation has been 
achieved as between use A and use B since no 
reallocation could generate greater economic product. 
 
Optimal temporal allocative efficiency for water that 
may be stored and used in the future requires that the 
discounted present marginal values of water for use in 
the present and in all future time periods be equal.  For 
example, if the marginal value of water (net of 
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evaporation) in a reservoir has a current use value of 
$100 per acre-foot and the expected present value of use 
five years from now is $200 per acre-foot after 
allowances for storage and risk costs, there is temporal 
misallocation.  Use of water in the present should be 
curtailed and saved for future use when the value is 
higher.  
 
DIFFERENT INCENTIVES DRIVE PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE DECISIONS IN WATER 
DISTRIBUTION 
 
There are basically two types of private water suppliers: 
investor-owned and mutually-owned companies.  The 
former may sell stock to the public, but most frequently 
are the property of a developer or an individual owner.  
These companies operate for profit just as does any 
private firm competing for capital, labor, and land.  
However, like electric utilities, these firms most often 
operate in what is considered to be a natural monopoly 
market, and thus are regulated by several state agencies 
(the most important in most states is a Public Service 
Commission). 
 
Mutually-owned companies do not operate for profit per 
se, and are usually not regulated.  Instead, because the 
system users are also the mutual owners, rewards to 
efficiency are returned to the users in the form of low 
water rates.  Because of their ownership structure, 
however, mutually-owned companies tend to have 
management problems that have the potential for 
decreasing efficiency.  Why is this so? 
 
The ownership structure of a company determines the 
incentives for efficient management.  Economists have 
captured the essence of this issue in the notion of the 
“residual claimant.”  The owners of a for-profit firm 
have the residual claim on profits, and are therefore 
motivated strongly to monitor the management of the 
firm.  Because their wealth is at stake, they have an 
incentive to minimize shirking by the employees of the 
firm and other practices that reduce efficiency.  Unless 
the owners of the firm earn a competitive rate of return, 
they will withdraw their capital and place it elsewhere 
where returns are higher.  In short, the survival of the 
firm is at risk.  Competition for resources is a harsh 
taskmaster and furnishes a tremendously strong 
incentive for efficiency, cost minimization, and dynamic 
innovations that are expected to improve the 
competitive position of the firm. 
 
I do not mean to infer that private firms do not have 
problems that dissipate efficiency.  If the firm is owned 
by many individuals, such as is the case with most 
corporations that issue stock to the public, the residual 
returns are spread across multiple owners, often 
numbered in the thousands.  Hence, the incentive for 
each individual owner to get involved in monitoring 
efficiency is greatly diminished.  He will bear the costs 
of his efforts himself, but will share the benefits with all 
of the other equity owners.  This situation is an example 
of the “free-rider” problem that exists in all forms of 
collective action, whether private or public.  If the free-
rider problem is potentially serious, however, 
monitoring of efficiency may be transferred by the 
owners to an agent who will be hired to do the job.  But 
this may lead to another generic difficulty called the 
“principal-agent” problem, wherein the agent has an 
incentive to act in his own interest rather than that of the 
principal and must himself be carefully monitored.  
Devices such as bonding the agent and limiting his 
discretion by minute contract specification may be used 
to reduce the principal-agent problem.   
 
Still, despite these problems in private firms, I would 
argue that in capitalistic societies private firms have 
been highly successful in monitoring efficiency and thus 
have provided goods and services at minimum cost that 
consumers desire. 
 
Unfortunately, government (public) firms and agencies 
have no such incentives to produce efficiently.  There 
are many reasons.  I do not question the integrity or 
quality of individuals who serve us in public 
institutions.  They behave rationally as would any of us 
in a similar environment.  But investment and operating 
capital are not acquired in competitive capital markets.  
Capital is generally provided through government 
appropriations as well as revenues from user fees.  But 
almost always prices are set by administrative fiat and 
become highly politicized.  This is why nearly all public 
firms distributing mail, transportation, electricity, water, 
and sewerage services are subsidized in one form or 
another.  In addition, there is even a perverse 
relationship between price and cost.  Higher costs are 
used to justify higher prices.  And, unlike a private firm 
competing for capital, a public firm, at best, has only 
weak incentives to reduce costs.  In fact, in most 
bureaucracies, the larger the budget of the agency, the 
greater the political power of the agency and the greater 
the status of the agency’s administrators.   
 
Over the past two decades the public choice school has 
contributed greatly to our understanding of the failure of 
governmental agencies to produce public services 
efficiently (Anderson, 1983).  Three main concerns are: 
1) imperfect information and voter ignorance, 2) 
concentrated benefits and diffused costs, and 3) short-
sightedness of political decisions. 
 
For individual citizens, relevant information on public 
decisions is complex and costly to obtain.  And because 
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an individual voter’s “voice” in the voting booth is so 
very small as a fraction of all votes, voters do not find it 
rational to acquire the information to make really 
informed decisions on candidates and issues.  In other 
words, they remain “rationally ignorant.”  This implies 
that their votes may not reflect a full cognizance of full 
societal benefits and costs.  To the contrary, when they 
use their own resources to make purchases in the market 
they are motivated to acquire the optimal amount of 
information.  In addition, when voters vote for a 
candidate, they seldom can take a little of this and a 
little of that — rather, they elect a bundle of programs 
and policies favored by the candidate.  Therefore, 
citizens may not get from public action exactly what 
they would opt for if the choice were theirs alone to 
make, or if they could elect one issue at a time.  The 
result is an inefficient match between the outcomes of 
political decisions and what an individual citizen may 
really desire. 
 
Besides, it is well known that small numbers of citizens 
acting in concert who have large and concentrated 
benefits at stake in political decisions will expend 
tremendous effort and expense to “persuade” the 
politicians to grant the political favors that they desire.  
This is accomplished by contributions to political 
campaigns and other forms of “politicking.”  On the 
other hand, the majority of taxpayers who must pay for 
political favors given to the concentrated beneficiaries 
generally have only a small individual stake in the 
political action and, therefore, exert little political effort 
to block the transfer.  The ultimate consequence is that 
the process granting political favors is likely to be 
skewed and dominated by special and concentrated 
interests, and hardly efficient from the viewpoint of the 
electorate as a whole.   
 
Finally, there is the “short-sightedness” effect.  Because 
politicians must face the electorate every few years, 
they tend to be more concerned with programs and 
policies that emphasize short-term effects, rather than 
on long-term consequences.  This contrasts with private 
market decisions where wealth-maximizing 
entrepreneurs look to the long-term future in making 
optimal investment decisions. 
 
Terry Anderson (1983) concludes: “Given these 
characteristics of the political sector, the economics of 
public choice suggest that the information and incentive 
structure is likely to generate government failure.  
Efficiency in government is not apt to occur unless the 
incentive structure faced by governmental decision 
makers is altered to conform more closely to that 
described by the property rights paradigm.” 
 
The conclusion of this section is that economic theory 
strongly suggests that private water companies should 
have efficiency advantages over public companies.  
How might this be tested empirically?  One approach 
would be to observe if private firms offer water to 
similar consumers at lower prices than public firms do.  
This would imply that private companies have lower 
costs and are, therefore, more efficient. 
 
SOME EMPIRICAL COMPARISONS OF 
EFFICIENCY IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC 
WATER FIRMS   
 
In 1993 a student at Brigham Young University and I 
studied the water rates and policies of two private and 
two public water companies operating in the Salt Lake 
Valley of Utah (Hawkins, 1993).  One of the objectives 
of the study was to determine if public policy 
discriminated against the private companies and thus 
might account for the small number that then existed.  
 
White City Water was an investor-owned company at 
the time of the study while the Holliday Water 
Company was the largest mutually-owned private water 
system in Utah.  It is of some relevance that White City 
Water has since been converted into a public entity — 
the White City Water Improvement District with all the 
usual powers of a public district such as power to tax if 
the taxpayers approve.  This action in itself says 
something about the competitive abilities of purely 
private investor-owned companies in the water field in 
Utah. 
 
Holliday Water was established as a mutually-owned 
company in the late nineteenth century, and in 1990 
delivered water to 3,751 consumers in the southern part 
of Salt Lake City.  White City Water obtained water 
rights and established a water delivery system in the 
1940s to assist homebuyers in obtaining Federal Home 
Administration and Veteran’s Administration loans.  It 
operated south of Salt Lake City in the area that is now 
Sandy City, and in 1990 provided water to over 3,600 
connections.  At the time of the study about 50 percent 
of the ownership control was held by one individual. 
Sandy City Water was and is a municipal public utility 
that sold water to over 20,000 connections in 1990.  In 
fact, Sandy City now completely surrounds the private 
Holliday Water system. 
   
Salt Lake City Water incorporated as a public company 
in 1876 and by 1990 had grown to over 80,000 
connections.  It sells water to Salt Lake City and a few 
surrounding communities.  It is a typically large and 
public municipal water delivery company.
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Table 1:  Tariff Comparisons for Four Utah Water Companies; 1993 
 
Company Name Minimum Fee ($)/ 
Water Allowance 
(gals.) 
Excess Water Cost 
($/1,000 gals.) 
Hookup Fee ($) 
Holliday 3.00/5,900 0.40 970.00 
White City 8.00/6,000 0.52 950.00 
Sandy City 
    In city limits 
    Union/Jordan 
    County service 
 
8.85/6,000 
11.94/6,000 
16.45/6,000 
 
0.54 
0.54 
0.68 
 
1,170.00 
1,626.00 
2,129.00 
Salt Lake City 
    In city limits 
    County service 
 
6.45/7,480 
8.95/7,480 
 
0.58 
0.86 
 
970.00 
1,092.00 
 
 Source: Hawkins (1993). 
 
 
Table 1 gives the 1990 rate structure for these four 
companies.  The data show that the private 
companies supplied water at lower rates than did 
the public ones.  Holliday had the lowest rates for 
the first 5,900 gallons used, and thereafter on larger 
blocks of water.  In fact, the marginal rates on the 
excess water over the minimum allowance were 
lower for both of the private than for the public 
companies.  These data also indicate that both of 
the public companies delivered water to their own 
residents at far cheaper rates than were paid by their 
customers living outside the city limits.  (This is 
also a characteristic of public companies and raises 
a host of efficiency and equity questions that are 
beyond the scope of this paper.) 
 
Of course, the value of water may also be 
influenced by the reliability of delivery and the 
quality of water.  Are there differences among these 
companies in these respects?  The answer seems to 
be negative, since no serious complaints in recent 
years were registered with the Public Service 
Commission by water users from any of the four 
systems. 
 
DISCRIMINATORY REGULATION 
AGAINST THE PRIVATE COMPANIES 
 
No efficiency comparisons between private and 
public water companies would be meaningful 
without analysis of the differences that confront 
them in the regulatory environment.  Indeed, it will 
be shown that the explicit discrimination against the 
private companies has been so severe in Utah that it 
is a wonder that even one still exists.  
Discrimination exists in the following areas: 1) the 
Public Service Commission/Department of Public 
Services (PSC/DPU), 2) the State Engineer’s office, 
3) state policy providing subsidized financing for 
public water utilities, and 4) different taxation 
policies facing private and public water companies. 
 
The Utah State Code allows water utilities 
operating under the PSC of Utah to recover the cost 
of investment in depreciable utility plants by 
changing rates collected from consumers.  White 
City Water, an investor-owned for-profit company, 
was regulated by the PSC whereas Holliday Water 
as a mutually-owned company was not.  This fact 
alone may explain why Holliday’s rates were far 
lower than the other three.  White City Water had to 
bear the legal and administrative costs of 
petitioning the PSC/DUP for rate increases to cover 
depreciation and other costs.  We have no precise 
estimate of these costs in this case, but all regulated 
public utilities know that they are significant.  
There can be little question that a competitive rate 
of return on the firm’s assets could be obtained with 
lower water rates were it not for this regulatory 
burden. 
 
The State Engineer (SE), the agency in Utah which 
supervises water rights and proposals for changes in 
water diversions, takes a much more restrictive 
stance against private companies than public 
companies in allowing water acquisitions and 
changes of use of water in accordance with 
projected demands.  The problem is that in states 
where prior appropriation law is used to allocate 
water, beneficial use must be demonstrated to the 
state regulatory body.  “Public entities can 
distribute water to a variety of uses at their own 
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discretion under their corporate right while private 
companies must provide greater definition and 
more detailed proof in justification of each kind of 
use” (Bagley and Haws 1985, p. 10).  Moreover, 
public entities enjoy substantially more latitude in 
acquiring and holding water rights in expectation of 
future needs than do private firms. In other words, a 
public company anticipating increases in water 
demand can argue that this demand is “beneficial 
use” more successfully than can a private company.  
Part of the reasoning for the SE’s rigid standard of 
beneficial use for private water companies is the 
underlying bureaucratic conviction that the state 
should not furnish its resources for purposes that 
are not strictly “public” in nature.  Hence, the 
public should not be involuntarily committed 
through the taxing powers of the state to underwrite 
private ventures that generate private benefits to 
their owners.  The effect of this position is that the 
SE is actually blocking the transfer of water rights 
from public to private firms, even when analysis 
demonstrates that the private users value the water 
at higher levels. 
Another difference in the environments of private 
and public companies is in the financing of capital 
projects.  The State of Utah has appropriated funds 
that are loaned to water companies at below market 
rates of interest.  In fact, in some cases of perceived 
hardship, interest charges may be waived entirely.  
The authority to grant low-interest loans rests with 
the Division of Water Resources (DWR).  DWR 
holds to the position that public water companies 
should be favored in the granting of loans, and that 
taxpayer money should not be allowed to contribute 
to a “private” purpose.  In fact, no large private 
water company has been the recipient of a DWR 
loan in recent history.  Therefore, the Cities Water 
Loan Fund administered by DWR, is designated 
strictly for public companies.  Private companies, 
on the other hand, must obtain funds from the 
capital market where risk is an important 
component of the interest rate that the company is 
required to pay.  Furthermore, obtaining market 
loans may be difficult for private water companies 
because only system capital can serve as collateral.  
Since water companies are capital intensive, like 
other utilities, this kind of discrimination in favor of 
the public companies can make a huge difference in 
whether the private companies can be competitive. 
 
Finally, public and private companies are taxed 
differently.  Investor-owned private water 
companies are subject to property and income taxes 
and mutually-owned companies are subject to 
property taxes, whereas public water companies are 
not taxed at all.  This can be important as illustrated 
by the fact that in 1991, White City Water paid 
$12,578 in property taxes, $2,171 in utility 
regulatory assessment fees, $59,327 in federal 
income taxes, and $10,267 in state income taxes, 
while none of these taxes were borne by the public 
water utilities.  This amounted to $23.43 per 
connection per year, not an inconsiderable financial 
burden.  If a private firm pays these taxes, and its 
prices to consumers are lower than those of the 
public firms, and if prices cover costs in the long 
run, then it follows that other costs of the private 
firms must be lower than those of the public firms.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Despite explicit discrimination against private 
water companies in several ways, our evidence 
suggests that the rates of the private companies 
were lower than those of public companies that 
served the same classes of consumers in similar 
geographical locations.  Public choice theory 
predicts that private companies will be more 
efficient than public ones because of incentives that 
contribute to efficiency.  So the theory is supported 
by the data.  But much more empirical testing needs 
to be done in Utah and elsewhere.  What seems to 
be quite clear is that economic efficiency would be 
served and lower rates would ensue if public policy 
ceased discriminating against the private companies 
in order to allow them to compete on a level 
playing field.  The SE’s office should apply the 
same standards to private companies obtaining 
water rights and desiring water transfers as are 
applied to public companies.  State-subsidized 
financing to public companies should cease.  But if 
this is politically infeasible, then economic 
efficiency would be enhanced if the same subsidies 
were offered to private companies.  State and 
federal taxes should be uniformly applied to private 
and public water companies, and to investor-owned 
and to mutually-owned firms. 
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